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Abstract
This paper synthesizes the academic, professional, and policy literature on research partnerships with an eye toward
technology policy. Based on available theory and empirical investigations, there are a variety of important reasons why firms
participate in research partnerships and a number of reasons why governments encourage them. We conclude that technology
policy authorities need to be aware of these reasons and accordingly be cautious when comparing the benefits with the
downside effects associated with collaboration. q2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
As with most public policy-related subjects, im-
portant contributions to the literature of what we call
research partnerships have been made by scholars
from a number of disciplines. While most of the
research reviewed herein has appeared in economics
and management journals or in scholarly books, it is
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important to emphasize that the contributing authors
represent not only those disciplines but also others
— such as public administration, philosophy of sci-
ence, and science and technology policy — and,
they come from a host of countries. As such, there is
a variety of indigenous terminologies at play.
Accordingly, our first order of business is to
bound the topic of research partnerships by establish-
ing a common set of terms. What we offer here is
but one interpretation of the various terms and con-
cepts that will be reviewed in this paper. Certainly,
those in the field may agree or disagree with our
taxonomy of terms, but a starting point is needed to
navigate systematically through the literature.
As our starting point, we define a research part-
nership broadly as an innovation-based relationship
that involves, at least partly, a significant effort in
0048-7333r00r$ - see front matter q 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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. 4 research and development R&D . This definition
of a research partnership follows, in spirit, from that
recently used by the Council on Competitiveness
.  . 1996 p. 3 :
Partnerships are defined... as cooperative ar-
rangements engaging companies, universities, and
government agencies and laboratories in various
combinations to pool resources in pursuit of a
shared R&D objective.
The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to synthe-
size the academic, professional, and policy literature
on research partnerships. Our review is presented
with an eye toward technology policy — the theme
of this special issue.
In Section 2, we offer a simple taxonomy of
research partnerships. The principal value of this
taxonomy is to provide one vehicle for discussing
not only the literature, but also the data related to
research partnerships that are being analyzed by
empirical researchers and policy makers. In Section
3, the theoretical literature on research partnerships
is overviewed. This theoretical literature has primar-
ily focused on two broad issues: Why is a research
partnership formed? and What are the results from
the formation of a research partnership? Section 4
discusses the related empirical literature. With the
availability of systematic databases on research part-
nerships during the last few years, this literature has
grown rapidly and is becoming the foundation for
evaluating the effectiveness of related policies. Sec-
tion 5 offers a brief description of current technology
policies that relate to research partnerships in various
industrial nations. Section 6 summarizes our review.
2. Toward a taxonomy of research partnerships
Based on our definition of a research partnership,
namely that a research partnership is as an innova-
4 This definition resembles what others have called a strategic
technical alliance which is a special case of a strategic alliance.
. Teece 1992 , for example, defines a strategic alliance as a web of
agreements whereby two or more partners share the commitment
to reach a common goal by pooling their resources and coordinat-
ing their activities.
tion-based relationship, it follows that there are at
least two ways to characterize such a relationship
and hence to characterize research partnerships.
5
Research partnerships can be characterized in terms
of the members of the relationship, or they can be
characterized in terms of the organizational structure
of the relationship; however, these two dimensions
need not be independent. We consider both charac-
terizations in this section, but we devote greater
attention to the latter because the theoretical and
institutional literature has so developed.
2.1. Partners in a research partnership
At a broad level, the partners in a research part-
nership can come from either the public sector or the
private sector. Obviously, when a partner is a gov-
ernmental agency, such as a federally funded re-
search laboratory in the United States, it represents
the public sector; when a partner is a private firm, it
represents the private sector. Many partnerships also
involve universities, and from the perspective of
ownership authority a university can be public or
private. However, it is rarely the case that a univer-
sity’s research is not, at least in part, publicly funded.
Thus, we view for purposes of this taxonomy univer-
sities as part of the public sector.
6
Given these parameters, research partnerships can
be public, they can be private, or they can be pub-
licrprivate. From a technology policy perspective,
publicrprivate partnerships have attracted the great-
est attention because they represent a relationship
that directly embodies government intervention into
the innovation process and hence are scrutinized
more carefully.
5 Surprisingly, there is no uniformly accepted definition of
partnership in the academic or technology policy literature. For
.  . example, Coburn 1995 p. 1 used the term synonymously with
cooperation. Therein, he defined cooperative technology programs
as ‘‘public–private initiatives involving government and industry
— and often universities — that sponsor the development and the
use of technology and improved practices to measurably benefit
specific companies.’’
6 . Link forthcoming argues, on this basis, that all universities
are public.() J. Hagedoorn et al.rResearch Policy 29 2000 567–586 569
2.2. Organizational structure of research partner-
ships
2.2.1. Informal arrangements
Our organizational structure taxonomy of research
partnerships is visually described in Fig. 1. Research
partnerships can be formal or informal. Very little is
known about informal partnerships. We do know that
many firms informally partner with one another in
short-term research endeavors, but by the fact that
they are informal there is not a systematic way to
track these partnerships quantitatively much less to
. study them in detail. Link and Bauer 1989 reported
that nearly 90% of the research partnerships in which
cooperative-research active firms from a sample from
the U.S. manufacturing sector were involved were
informal in nature. Not only do firms informally
partner with one another, but also they informally
partner with universities, and, generally, in these
relationships, the university is serving in the role of a
short-term project-specific research subcontractor
. Hall et al., 1998 .
Fig. 1 also illustrates two categories of formal
research partnerships — research corporations and
. research joint ventures RJVs . Each is discussed
below.
2.2.2. Formal arrangements
During the 1980s and early 1990s, a number of
classification schemes of inter-firm relationships were
introduced in the management and economic litera-
ture that we find particularly relevant for understand-
ing research partnerships. Based on these schemes,
we distinguish two types of formal relationships
between firms: equity joint ventures that focus on
R&D, which we call research corporations; and
RJVs which are mainly contractual arrangements.
7
7 The difference in terminology with regard to different formal
agreements as used in economics and management may be confus-
ing. In the management literature, joint ventures are mainly equity
joint ventures, whereas RJVs are usually categorized as contrac-
tual agreements. These different categories and classifications are
. also apparent in the contribution of Link and Bauer 1989 ,
. . Hagedoorn 1996 and Vonortas 1997 . In this paper, we follow
the terminology generally found in the economics literature.
Fig. 1. Taxonomy of research partnerships by organizational
structure.
Research corporations are created by at least two
firms that combine their R&D skills and resources
through equity joint ownership of a separate firm,
and generally this new firm or child performs only
R&D that fits within the broader context of the
 research agenda of the parent firms Hagedoorn,
. 1990 . Equity joint ventures can be analyzed in the
context of transitional firm strategies in different
. market situations. Berg and Hoekman 1988 and
. Harrigan 1988 have argued that market entry, repo-
sitioning, and expansion in existing markets, as well
as exit strategies in declining markets, are well known
rationales for firms to enter into equity joint ven-
tures. The equity joint ventures are associated with
the spreading of risks, sharing of fixed costs, captur-
ing of economies of scale, gaining access to new
markets, achieving competitive repositioning, and
sharing of research efforts. These same general argu-
ments hold for research corporations.
. Many observers e.g., Hladik, 1985; OECD, 1986
have argued that research corporations became popu-
lar during the 1980s. Despite the still existing popu-
larity of research corporations, the economic and
organizational stability of this mode appears ques-
tionable. Several studies have estimated that about
half of all R&D-related equity joint ventures fall
 short of expectations or are disbanded Berg et al.,
. 1982; Kogut, 1988b . Major reasons for these so-
called failures are found in either different views of
participating firms on strategy, or difficulties associ-
ated with the management of the venture. More
specifically, problems in maintaining research corpo-
rations are generally thought to derive from the risks
of sharing proprietary know-how, the desire for con-
trol by individual partners, coordination of different
time-horizons, disagreement on design specifica-
tions, government policies, and the effects of mini-
mum efficient scale in R&D that can make decen-
tralization of R&D both costly and difficult to con-() J. Hagedoorn et al.rResearch Policy 29 2000 567–586 570
 trol Harrigan, 1985; Hladik, 1985; OECD, 1986;
. 8 Obleros and Macdonald, 1988 .
RJVs, such as joint R&D pacts or consortia to
cover non-equity agreements, are created so that
firms and other organizations can pool resources in
order to undertake joint R&D activities. Although
the success of such agreements is dependent upon a
strong commitment of the partners, the organiza-
tional interdependence is usually less than in a re-
search corporation because no new organizational
entity is established. If certain RJV projects are not
successful, they can be terminated with only a rela-
tively small loss compared to the loss that would be
incurred when a research corporation is dissolved
. Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1990; Duysters, 1996 .
A specific subset of RJVs are research contracts
that concern R&D cooperation in which one firm
contracts another firm, frequently a smaller one, to
perform a particular research project. For the con-
tract-initiating firm, advantages can be found in the
possibility to focus on particular areas of research
with substantial cost saving compared to in-house
research facilities. Disadvantages for that firm can be
found in the lack of in-house expertise to assess the
value of contract research and the dissociation of
development expertise from manufacturing expertise.
. The advantages for the other smaller contractor are
found in R&D funding and cooperation with a larger
entity. Disadvantages are found in low profit margins
on contract research and licensing, and in the transi-
. tory nature of these agreements Hagedoorn, 1996 .
3. Theoretical perspectives on research partner-
ships
There is a vast literature that attempts to explain,
from a theoretical perspective, why firms enter into
formal research partnerships and what are the results
of such relationships to the partners, industry, and
society at large. We distinguish in Fig. 2 between
three broad categories of literature in addressing
8 . However, Contractor and Lorange 1988 and others doubt
whether there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the failure
rate of research corporations exceeds the normal failure rate for
single-firm ventures.
Fig. 2. Formal research partnerships.
these issues: transaction costs, strategic management,
and industrial organization theory. The basic ratio-
nale for these categories is the long-standing division
of labor between theorists. Management theorists
have traditionally focused on the firm and the inter-
nal organization of its activities. Industrial organiza-
tion theorists have, until recently, typically taken the
firm as the unit of observation to examine strategic
intent and the effects of firm actions on industrial
structure, economic efficiency, and social welfare.
Transaction cost theory can be viewed ex post as a
hybrid of the two. It tries to explain the reasons for
firms to organize internally, while addressing market
or industry forces.
Any literature taxonomy is partially an arbitrary
exercise, and the taxonomy in Fig. 2 is no exception.
It can be argued, for example, that most if not all
approaches listed under the strategic management
category have used arguments from the transaction
cost and industrial organization categories.
9 Simi-
larly, the transaction cost and industrial organization
approaches have undoubtedly drawn on strategic
management to support various arguments. Rather
than mutually exclusive, the analytical approaches
presented here are complementary as viewed both
across and within individual categories.
3.1. Transaction costs
A natural starting point for explaining the emer-
gence of research partnerships is the theory of the
firm, a formidable branch of which is transaction
cost economics. According to this school of thought,
entrepreneurs try different ways to organize a trans-
action, including arm’s length markets and market
displacements through internal administrative organi-
9 . Combs 1999 , for example, uses a strategic management
approach with transaction costs.() J. Hagedoorn et al.rResearch Policy 29 2000 567–586 571
. zations or hierarchies Williamson, 1975, 1985 . As-
suming a market with no external interference, the
most economically efficient organizational design is
believed to prevail over time. The boundary between
the market and the firm will then be determined by
the relative costs of carrying out a transaction under
each organizational structure.
Transaction cost theorists have more recently be-
gun to explore alternative forms of adaptation, such
as involving cooperation among organizations
. Menard, 1996a,b; Williamson, 1996 and research
partnerships generally fall into this category.
In order to explain why research partnerships
form, one must determine why such organizations
would have a cost advantage over either the market
or a hierarchical organization form of operation for
the specific type of activity. Students of transaction
cost theory have posited two kinds of relevant costs:
production costs and transaction costs. Production
costs may vary from firm to firm according to
proprietary knowledge, abilities to learn, and
economies of scale and scope. Transaction costs may
vary from transaction to transaction. They refer to
‘‘the expense incurred for writing and enforcing
contracts, for haggling over terms and contingent
claims, for deviating from optimal kinds of invest-
ments in order to increase dependence on a party or
to stabilize a relationship, and for administering a
. transaction’’ Kogut, 1988a, p. 320 .
Transaction costs increase steeply when contracts
are incomplete, that is, when they do not fully
specify the actions of each party in every contin-
gency. Intangible assets, including technical knowl-
edge, are a primary cause of incomplete contracts.
Technical knowledge can be explicit, if in the form
of a patent or design, or implicit if in the form of
know-how shared among the employees. Technical
knowledge is subject to positive externalities or
spillovers, its production is subject to significant
uncertainties, and its dissemination can induce op-
portunistic behavior. Research partnerships are thus
explained in transaction cost economics as a hybrid
form of organization between the market and the
hierarchy to facilitate carrying out an activity specifi-
cally related to the production and dissemination of
technical knowledge.
What makes this hybrid form of organization
preferable to the internalization of the market for
technical knowledge by bringing the necessary capa-
bilities under unified control? According to Kogut
. 1988a , the situational characteristic favoring the
research partnership is higher uncertainty over speci-
fying and monitoring the performance of the other
party. Research partnerships achieve a mechanism to
provide the necessary incentives to perform to re-
quired standards by turning the expected hostage
situation in the market transaction into a mutual
hostage situation in a cooperative agreement through





There are several approaches taken by strategic
management scholars. Five such approaches are re-
viewed below.
3.2.1. CompetitiÍe force
The competitive force approach toward research
. partnerships Porter, 1980, 1985; Harrigan, 1988
derives, in part, from the traditional structure-con-
duct-performance paradigm of industrial organiza-
tion theory. An effective competitive strategy in-
volves the firm taking offensive or defensive action
in order to create a defensible position against com-
petitors or influence them in its favor. Collaboration
is seen as a means of shaping competition by im-
proving a firm’s comparative competitive position.
Coalitions involve coordinating or sharing value
chains with partners that broaden the effective scope
of the firm’s own activities. By using coalitions, a
firm can benefit from a broader scope of activities
without spending precious resources to enter new
. market segments Porter, 1986 . Inter-firm techno-
logical collaboration permits firms to react swiftly to
10 The term resources must be interpreted broadly to include
both tangible and intangible resources such as goodwill, market
. reputation, and trust Zajac and Olsen, 1993; Gulati, 1995a,b . For
. a discussion, see Vonortas 1997 .
11 Strategic management analysts have tended to discuss strate-
gic technical alliances, a much broader set of relationships than
the research partnerships we focus on in this paper. We present
the arguments for strategic technical alliances under the presump-
tion that they also apply to the subset of research partnerships.
. This subsection draws on Lee and Vonortas forthcoming .() J. Hagedoorn et al.rResearch Policy 29 2000 567–586 572
market needs and allows them to bring technology to
the marketplace faster.
3.2.2. Strategic network
The strategic network approach argues that the
network is a new form of organization and strategy.
Multiple cooperative relationships of a firm can be
the source of its competitive strength. In general,
three categories of theoretical rationales can explain
the formation of strategic networks: efficiency, syn-
ergy, and power.
Networks can achieve efficiencies via scale and
scope economies and via the reduction of transac-
tional inefficiency in the open market. The network
arrangement allows a firm to concentrate on those
parts of the value chain that better reflect the firm’s
competitive advantage. Firms within a network are
thus able to capture the benefits of specialization,
focus, and scale. The effectiveness of a network can
be attributed to technological reasons, the opportu-
 nity for lowering transaction costs Gomes-Casseres,
. 1996 , and the possibility for joint value creation
. Jarillo, 1988 .
With respect to exploiting synergies, Miles and
. Snow 1984 argued that networks can be formed to
link and exploit the different competencies of a
group of firms within a quasi-organizational frame-
work. Network formation can also be understood by
using power as the central concept, meaning the
ability to influence the decisions or actions of others
. Thorelli, 1986 . Early adopters of network strategies
can enjoy a first-mover advantage in securing re-
sources, gaining market position and political influ-
ence, controlling information, and brokering new
. cooperative arrangements Miles and Snow, 1984 .
3.2.3. Resource-based Íiew of the firm
. This view, traceable to Penrose 1959 , has re-
cently become popular among strategic management
 analysts Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney,
1991; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Peteraf, 1993;
. Mowery et al., 1998 . According to this approach,
the sources of sustained competitive advantage are
firm resources that are valuable, rare, and not easily
substitutable. Performance is based on the strategic
differentiation that the firm achieves in the market-
place, that is, the firm’s unique capabilities and its
competitors’ difficulty in imitating them. In high
technology industries, such capabilities relate primar-
ily to the development and exploitation of advanced
technologies.
Access to external complementary resources may
be necessary in order to fully exploit the existing
resources and develop sustained competitive advan-
. tages Teece, 1986 . Alliances, including research
partnerships, can facilitate access. Alliances may,
however, work better in some environments than in
. others Chesbrough and Teece, 1996 .
3.2.4. Dynamic capabilities
This approach is a related dynamic view of re-
 source and capability accumulation Teece and
. Pisano, 1994; Teece et al., 1997 . The primary focus
is on the mechanisms by which firms accumulate
and deploy new skills and capabilities, and on the
contextual factors that influence the rate and direc-
. tion of this process. Teece et al. 1997 define dy-
namic capabilities as the firm’s ability to integrate,
build, and reconfigure internal and external compe-
tencies to address rapidly changing environments.
Inter-firm collaboration can be viewed as a vehi-
cle for organizational learning, that can be used to
analyze the motive, process and outcome of strategic
 technical alliances Hamel and Prahalad, 1989;
. . Mody, 1993 . Prahalad and Hamel 1990 , for exam-
ple, point to cooperative relationships as a means for
internalizing core competencies and enhancing com-
petitiveness. A primary factor influencing a firm’s
ability to develop technology-based competencies
via a cooperative venture is the potential to learn
. from that relationship. Hamel 1991 takes a skill-
based view of the firm, considering an alliance pri-
marily as a route to acquire the skills of another firm.
A rapidly expanding stream of literature has
emerged during the last few years focusing on corpo-
rate learning and organizational modes that facilitate
. such learning Foss, 1993; Kogut and Zander, 1993 .
Cooperation is considered a mechanism to facilitate
the transfer of certain types of knowledge and en-
hance the firm’s learning capabilities. It is not so
 much the cost of the transfer which would be the
. focus of the transaction cost approach but the effec-
tiveness of the transfer and the ability or experience
of the firm in accessing and handling new knowl-
edge that may create the need for collaboration. The
literature on the learning organization is clearly re-() J. Hagedoorn et al.rResearch Policy 29 2000 567–586 573
lated to the resource-based view of the firm and the
 dynamic capabilities approaches Hodgson, 1998;
. Sachwald, 1998 . Research partnerships are seen as
mechanisms enabling firms to learn and enter new
. technological areas Dodgson, 1991 and to deal
more effectively with technological and market un-
certainty.
3.2.5. Strategic options to new technologies
This approach to explaining collaboration comple-
ments the dynamic capabilities approach by consid-
ering how managers can determine prospectively the
set of resources and capabilities necessary for supe-
rior future performance in uncertain market environ-
. ments Sanchez, 1993 . Strategy can be considered
as a process of continuously maximizing the strate-
. gic options of a firm Sanchez, 1995 . This model
can be applied to evaluating the ways in which
 different organizational schemes market, network,
. and hierarchy contribute to or impede the firm’s
 ability to optimize its strategic options Dixit and
. Pindyck, 1995; Trigeorgis, 1996 . It is suggested that
a research partnership that allows resources to be
incrementally committed, contingent on positive out-
comes, will often be more attractive than precommit-
ting the full expected cost for developing a new
technology especially in the presence of high market
and technological uncertainty. Collaboration may as-
sist companies to gain valuable experience and in-
crease their exposure to related markets and their
ability to sense and respond to new opportunities
. Kogut, 1991 .
3.3. Industrial organization
Industrial organization scholars have been inter-
ested in the resource allocation and economic wel-
fare effects of inter-firm cooperation in R&D as part
of a broader concern over the potentiality of failure
in the market of scientific and technological knowl-
edge. This failure is due to the perceived public good
nature of knowledge that makes its production rela-
tively more expensive than its transmission.
12 The
12 It is now clear that transmission is not free as was essentially
. represented in earlier models Cohen and Levinthal, 1989 . Never-
theless, the fundamental resource allocation problem remains.
difficulty in appropriating the returns from knowl-
edge is said to account for inadequate incentives to
invest in it.
Recent theoretical literature dealing with techno-
logical competition has depended heavily on game-
theoretic tools and formal mathematical modeling.
The models can essentially be categorized into two
categories: non-tournament models and tournament.
The expectation of market failure has driven the
analyses, and it is reflected in under-investment and
duplication of non-cooperative R&D effort in non-
tournament models and the over-investment in R&D
in tournament models.
3.3.1. Non-tournament models
Non-tournament models focus on the extent of
innovation, approximated by the degree of cost re-
duction or product differentiation. Firms are assumed
to invest in R&D in order to, for example, decrease
costs and then compete in terms of prices or outputs
in the product market. The model’s defining charac-
teristics are a setup with many different research
paths that firms in an industry can follow in pursuit
of technological advance, and the possibility of more
than one winner. An advance made on one research
path may be used irrespective of whether competitor
firms have also made similar advances on other
research paths. These paths, however, are suffi-
ciently similar to be viewed as perfect substitutes.
This similarity allows for the incorporation of R&D
spillovers into the models, meaning that knowledge
can escape the control of the firm and benefit the
competitor pursuing another research path.
The vast majority of the theoretical work on
cooperative R&D has, until recently, followed the
non-tournament approach. Strategic, static, multi-
stage models comparing the performance of coopera-
tive and non-cooperative industrial setups in the
presence of imperfectly appropriable, cost-reducing
R&D are replete in the literature. Such analyses
. followed the seminal contributions of Spence 1984 ,
. . Katz 1986 and D’Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988 ,
including, for example, De Bondt and Veugelers
. . . 1991 , De Bondt et al. 1992 , Kamien et al. 1992 ,
. . Suzumura 1992 , Simpson and Vonortas 1994 ,
. . Vonortas 1994 , and Brod and Shivakumar 1997 .
The basic focus has been the investigation of the() J. Hagedoorn et al.rResearch Policy 29 2000 567–586 574
relative efficiencies of competition and cooperation
in R&D — specifically in RJVs — in raising final
output production and enhancing social welfare.
A consistent finding across most of this literature
has been that spillovers have an important role in
defining the relative efficiencies of non-cooperative
and cooperative industrial setups. In the absence of
. spillovers, the market non-cooperation seems to do
better. The reverse happens in the presence of
spillovers. By internalizing knowledge spillovers,
partnerships tend to break the trade-off between
spillovers and R&D investment. Cooperation may,
then, improve firm incentives to undertake highly
inappropriable R&D, especially when the product
market is relatively not concentrated andror inde-
pendent and competing R&D is also undertaken.
R&D cooperation performs consistently better — in
terms of resulting in more R&D investment and
greater output — the higher the rate of knowledge
spillovers. Moreover, the extent of information shar-
ing among partners is positively related to the ability
of the research partnership to raise social welfare. In
symmetric industry settings, partnerships that both
coordinate R&D efforts and that achieve greater
information sharing among partners yield the highest
technological efforts and social welfare, surpassing
research partnerships that simply coordinate R&D
 efforts Kamien et al., 1992; Combs, 1993; Vonortas,
. 13 1994 .
3.3.2. Tournament models
Tournament models emphasize the timing of in-
novation where the winner of an innovative race
earns the right to an exogenously or endogenously
determined monopolistic return.
14 This essentially
implies a single path to the technological advance,
and the game often takes the form of a patent race.
The analytical focus of tournament models has been
on determining the number of firms entering the
race; the aggregate R&D investment, and its distri-
13 Recent work has shown that certain results from the static,
multistage literature concerning the impacts of cooperation on the
behavior of individual partners and on social welfare also carry
over into dynamic environments. See, for example, Joshi and
. Vonortas 1997 .
14 In addition to single innovations and single races, one can
also have innovation sequences and corresponding race sequences
. Vickers, 1986 .
bution across firms and time; and the effects of
market power, technological advantage and techno-
. logical uncertainty Reinganum, 1989 .
In the models with knowledge sharing, coopera-
tion may well decrease overall R&D expenditures
 compared to the non-cooperative setup Martin,
. 1994 . Even so, if partners compete in the product
market following the innovation, cooperation will, in
general, be socially beneficial by passing more of the
gains to the consumers. However, the requirement in
such a model that the winner shares the available
information with the losers means that the partner-
ship will not form unless it is subsidized. Such
results can be extended to the case where the part-
nership does not incorporate all firms in the industry.
The socially optimal market structure for organizing
R&D proves to be complex, however, depending on
the number of firms and the ability of the partners to
exclude rivals from the technology.
One example of the tournament approach to R&D
collaboration is found in Katsoulacos and Ulph
. 15 1997 , who address two basic issues. The first
issue relates to the endogeneity of knowledge
spillovers in RJVs; in addition to the amount of
R&D expenditure, firms can choose their spillover
parameter both inside and outside the partnership.
16
The second issue related to whether firms undertake
complementary or substitutive R&D. These two is-
sues are important in the context of policies subsidiz-
ing information-sharing research partnerships that
have been implemented in the United States and
European Union. It is shown that firms choose to
cooperate fully when they undertake complementary
 R&D and the cooperative equilibrium then is the
. social optimum . If the firms undertake substitutive
R&D, they share no information outside the partner-
ship. While they are better off joining a partnership,
subsidies are necessary to turn the cooperative equi-
librium to a socially optimum solution.
Overall, as summarized in Table 1, the theoretical
literature on research partnerships has varies in terms
15 . See also Grossman and Shapiro 1987 for a model of dy-
namic R&D competition in which the effects of both RJVs and
patent licensing activities can be studied.
16 RJV partner incentives to share their know-how in the pres-
ence of uncertainty have been analyzed by Perez-Castrillo and
. Sandonis 1996 .() J. Hagedoorn et al.rResearch Policy 29 2000 567–586 575
Table 1
Theoretical arguments to two basic questions related to research partnerships
Question Transaction costs Strategic management Industrial organization
Incentives to form a ¯ Minimize cost of transactions ¯ Share R&D costs ¯ Share R&D costs
research partnership involving intangible assets ¯ Pool risks ¯ Pool risks
. technical knowledge
¯ Circumvent incomplete ¯ Pool risks ¯ Pool risks
contracts
¯ Avoid opportunistic ¯ Economies of scale and scope ¯ Economies of scale and scope
market behavior
¯ Avoid high costs of ¯ Co-opt competition ¯ Co-opt competition
internalizing the activity ¯ Improve competitive position ¯ Accelerate return on investments
¯ Coordinate value chains with ¯ Access complementary resources
coalition partners ¯ Decelerate rate of innovation
¯ Increase efficiency, synergy, ¯ Increase market power
power through network
¯ Access complementary resources
to exploit own resources
¯ Use collaboration as learning
vehicle to accumulate and deploy new
skills and capabilities
¯ Learn from partners; transfer
technology
¯ Create new investment options
Expected results of
research partnerships
Partners ¯ Successfully meet incentives ¯ Successfully meet incentives ¯ Successfully meet incentives
¯ Interdependency ¯ Interdependency
¯ Increase R&D efficiency
¯ Increase flow of information
Industry, society ¯ Better resource allocation ¯ Industry competitiveness ¯ Increase overall R&D expenditures
when spillovers are high
¯ Increase social welfare
¯ Subsidize on certain occasions
of both research focus and results. This variability
reflects the fact that industrial setups differ in terms
of market organization, the environment for innova-
tion, strategic interaction between firms, and the
objectives and organization of inter-firm collabora-
tive agreements. And in addition, no two firms are
alike, and their strategies differ even within the same
. industry Nelson, 1995 .
4. Empirical perspectives on research partner-
ships
The empirical literature on research partnerships
has over the years taken one of two approaches. One
approach investigates research partnership activity
through analyses of existing data sets or through
specialized surveys, and the other approach investi-
gates using the case studies. Both research methods
have reached important conclusions and have pro-
vided useful insights into science and technology
policy.
The database analyses are, however, fragmented,
and somewhat limited both in numbers and in scope
because few systematic databases exist and because
survey work has been constrained as scholars are
still in the learning stage with regards to research
partnership behavior.
4.1. Existing databases related to research partner-
ships
Three major databases related to research partner-
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4.1.1. The MERIT-CATI database
 The MERIT-CATI Cooperative Agreements and
. Technology Indicators database is a relational
database covering over 13,000 technical cooperative
agreements involving about 6000 different parent
companies. It contains information on each agree-
ment and selected information on those companies
participating in agreements. Cooperative agreements
are defined as common interests between industrial
partners that are not connected through ownership.
Joint research pacts, second-sourcing, and licensing
agreements are examples of inter-firm agreements in
this database.
17
Relevant input of information for each alliance
relates to: the number of companies involved, names
of companies or important subsidiaries, year of es-
tablishment, time-horizon, duration and year of dis-
solution, capital investments and involvement of
. banks and research institutes or universities, field s
of technology, and modes of cooperation.
The MERIT-CATI database is maintained by John
Hagedoorn and his colleagues.
4.1.2. The CORE database
. The CORE COoperative REsearch database was
constructed under the sponsorship of the National
Science Foundation and is maintained under their
support by Link. Its resource base is information
contained in filings with the U.S. Department of
 Justice as reported in the Federal Register dis-
. 18 cussed in Section 5 .
Research partnerships gain two significant bene-
fits from such voluntary filing with the Department
of Justice: if subjected to criminal or civil antitrust
action, they are evaluated under a rule-of-reason
criterion that determines whether the venture im-
proves social welfare; and if found to fail the crite-
rion, they are subject to actual rather than treble
damages.
17 Since CATI is primarily related to technology cooperation, it
does not cover production or marketing joint ventures, agreements
that simply regulate the setting of standards, and other non-tech-
nology partnerships.
18 The partnerships filing with the Department of Justice are
classified by the Department as RJVs. Most of them are non-equity
RJVs. It has become common in the literature to refer to Federal
Register filings as RJVs.
The unit of observation in the CORE database is
the RJV. All public domain information contained in
each new and updated Federal Register filing is
coded in the CORE database, and that information is
supplemented with other sources of information to
describe the industry represented in the research
partnership.
19
4.1.3. The NCRA-RJV database
The NCRA-RJV database also uses information
on U.S.-based RJVs from the Federal Register. The
particular characteristic of this database is that it
enables research where the unit of analysis is the
partner rather than the partnership. Federal Register
information is supplemented with information on the
characteristics of the business partners from indepen-
dent sources, including CompuStat for publicly traded
firms and CorpTech for privately owned firms. Im-
portant features of the NCRA-RJV database include:
¯ the database, like CORE, covers partnerships con-
sistently classified as RJVs under a single official
definition;
¯ the database has been designed to support both
qualitative and quantitative research; and
¯ the database combines the information on joint
venture characteristics with longitudinal financial
performance information on business participants
and their industrial diversification.
20
The NCRA-RJV database is maintained by Vonortas.
4.2. Empirical research issues
The empirical research related to research partner-
. ships focuses on four general issues: i trends in
. research partnerships, ii composition and focus of
. research partnerships, iii motives for participating
. in research partnerships, and iv benefits from par-
ticipation in research partnerships.
4.2.1. Trends in research partnerships
Research on the MERIT-CATI database has re-
vealed a number of worldwide trends in the inter-firm
19 The CORE database, and its annual updates, is available upon
. request from Link. See Link 1996a; b for an expanded descrip-
tion of the database and its variables.
20 The contents of the database are described in greater length
. by Vonortas 1997 . The database is available upon request by
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technology partnerships during a period of more than
25 years. Specifically, the number of new partner-
ships set up annually gradually increased from about
30–40 in the early 1970s to 100–200 in the late
1970s. The 1980s marked a period of a further rapid
increase. Starting from around 200 per year, the
number of new partnerships announced every year
reached around 600 or more later in the 1980s and
1990s.
Although formal research partnerships were little
known about during the 1970s, researchers have
found some indications that this organizational form
. was gaining in popularity. Hladik 1985 docu-
mented how researchers of the well-known Harvard
Multinational Enterprise project were somewhat puz-
zled by the increasing number of international R&D
joint ventures. At the time, it was thought that joint
ventures would be aimed mainly at manufacturing
activities and not at critical, firm-specific activities
like R&D and innovation.
The MERIT-CATI data reveals that during the
early 1970s about 80% of the research partnerships
were research corporations. Gradually, this distribu-
tion changed. By the mid-1990s, more than 85% of
research partnerships did not involve equity invest-
ments. Globally, RJVs rapidly became the dominant
form of research partnerships.
Two additional trends are noteworthy; the degree
to which inter-firm research relationships are made
between domestic or international partners, and the
role that high-technology sectors play in inter-firm
technology collaboration. The share of domestic in-
ter-firm research collaboration recorded in the CATI
database as occurring during the 1970s and 1980s
was only about 35% of the total. The share of
domestic partnerships has gradually risen to about
45% during the 1990s. Further, this change has
largely been caused by the notable role of intra-U.S.
collaboration in two major fields, biotechnology and
information technology. The very important role that
United States firms have played in leading edge
research in these two fields not only makes them
attractive partners for international collaboration, but
also raises the probability of intra-U.S. joint research
at the scientific and technological frontier
. Hagedoorn, 1996 .
Following the OECD classification of industries
.  OECD, 1997 , during most of the 1970s when
some current high-technology activities such as bio-
technology and advanced materials research were
. almost non-existent , the share of high-technology
sectors was on average about 40% of the total num-
ber of inter-firm partnerships. During the late 1970s
and early 1980s, the share of high-technology re-
search collaboration increased to between 50% and
60%. From the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s this
share increased even further. According to the most
recent data, about 80% of the inter-firm research
relationships are established in high-technology in-
dustries. In other words, inter-firm research partner-
ships have become mainly concentrated in a small
number of high-technology industries.
. Research by Freeman and Hagedoorn 1994 and
. Hagedoorn 1996 revealed a number of other trends
in the international distribution of inter-firm research
partnerships based on their analysis of the CATI
database.
¯ The majority of research relationships have
been established within the Triad — North America,
Japan, and the European Union. During the 1970s
and 1980s the share of the Triad in all these partner-
ships was over 95%. In the 1990s, this dominance
became less strong as the share of other combina-
tions rose to about 20%.
¯ The growth of inter-firm research partnerships
with partners from outside the Triad reflects the
growth of the share of alliances with companies from
South East Asian countries, such as South Korea,
Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong.
¯ In high-technology industries, the share of the
intra-Triad research relationships has remained high.
Only during the mid-1990s did this share for the
developed economies decrease to about 90%.
¯ The growth in the share of non-Triad countries
is primarily in the non-high technology sectors, in-
cluding the more traditional engineering and manu-
facturing industries. The share of countries outside
the Triad in partnerships in these sectors increased
from about 15% in the 1970s and early 1980s to
about 30% during the 1990s.
The time trend of formation of U.S. research
partnerships registered with the Department of Jus-
tice in the United States has been studied extensively
through the CORE and NCRA-RJV databases. The
significant increases in registrations during 1985–
1995 have been followed by decreases in the last 3() J. Hagedoorn et al.rResearch Policy 29 2000 567–586 578
years, which have been particularly steep in 1997
and 1998. The reasons for this change are not clearly
understood. The changing fortunes of the Advanced
. Technology Program ATP — a rapid increase in
the funding of partnerships during 1994–1995 and a
significant drop afterwards — may explain part of
this change. Examining the formation of partnerships
. from the CORE database, Brod and Link 1996
concluded that another part of this trend is due to
changes over time in announced public attention by
the Department of Justice toward antitrust violations.
This so-called announcement effect gives firms a
greater incentive to seek indemnification and file
their cooperative R&D intentions.
4.2.2. Composition and focus of research partner-
ships
As previously discussed in Section 2, a research
partnership can be classified as public, private, or
publicrprivate on the basis of the composition of its
membership. Research on the composition of mem-
bers in RJVs is being conducted by a growing
number of scholars, with many paying particular
attention to the role of universities.
. . Baldwin 1996 , Baldwin and Link 1998 , and
. Vonortas 1997 document the extent to which uni-
versity participation in partnerships has changed over
. time; and Baldwin and Link 1998 and Hall et al.
. 1998 have gone beyond descriptive analyses to
investigate possible economic motives for why a
research group of firms would invite a university to
. participate. Relatedly, Leyden and Link 1999 asked
a similar question with regard to a federal laboratory
 being a research partner in a partnership and federal
laboratories have similar public characteristics to
. . universities . Both Baldwin and Link 1998 and
. Leyden and Link 1999 conclude that only the
larger partnerships — where size is measured in
terms of number of members — invite a public
partner to participate. The reason is that in large
partnerships appropriability has already been dimin-
ished due to the size of the venture.
Regarding the research focus of RJVs, Vonortas
. 1997 found for the United States that information
technology was the dominant field, followed by ad-
vanced materials. This findings largely agreed with
the more global evidence provided by Hagedoorn
.  1995 and Hagedoorn and Schakenraad 1990;
. 1992 .
4.2.3. MotiÍes for participating in research partner-
ships
. Link and Zmud 1984 , in what may be the first
broad-based empirical analysis of research partner-
ships, documented that firms in the then video dis-
play terminal industry undertook research coopera-
. tively and informally with other firms in an effort
to maintain and increase their market share. RJV
participation was a strategic means to be at the
forefront of new technological developments in the
field.
. . Relatedly, Link and Bauer 1989 and Link 1990
examined three possible strategic motives for a firm
to participate in a partnership: to gain technical
ability to diversify horizontally into new product
lines, to gain technical ability to vertically integrate
production activities, and to gain technical ability to
leap-frog competitions within their primary line of
business. Leap-frog competition was not a strategic
factor that influenced manufacturing firms’ decisions
to participate in partnerships.
21 Rather, those firms
that faced market threats from foreign competition
were using partnerships as a vehicle toward horizon-
tal diversification, and those not facing such pres-
sures were using partnerships as a vehicle to increase
their market share by becoming vertically integrated.
On the basis of this analysis of the European
. semiconductor industry, Martin 1996 has argued
that firms will engage in research partnerships, be
they domestic or international, to further their com-
petitive strategic goals. Public policies, at least in the
semiconductor industry, have not been successful in
Europe to redirect firms from these competitive
strategic goals toward an agenda that favors domes-
tic growth.
The strategic motives of firms to engage in re-
search partnerships were also emphasized in the
. empirical analysis of Vonortas 1997 . The examined
21 . In contrast, Rosegger 1989 argued that leap-frog competi-
tion over international rivals was the strategic motive for coopera-
tion in research by U.S. automobile manufacturers throughout the
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partnerships appeared to provide a vehicle for virtual
diversification into fluid technology fields — lack-
ing well specified technological trajectories — char-
acterized by high technological and market uncer-
tainty but also high technological opportunities and
growth potential.
22 In addition, firms participate in
order to raise the necessary R&D funds or leverage
their own, access complementary resources, exploit
research synergies, and create new investment op-
tions. These results strongly supported the argument
of the resource-based view of the firm and related
management approaches.
There is a well-documented history of informal
industryruniversity research relationships, but it has
only been the more recent literature that has focused
on the motivations and incentives to industry and to
academe to enter into such relationships.
23 While
this so-called behavioral empirical literature is just
developing, there appears to be a consensus of opin-
ion about certain issues. The first motivation is
access to complementary research activity and com-
24 . plementary research results. Cohen et al. 1997
provide a selective review of this strategic literature,
emphasizing the studies that have documented that
university research enhances firms sales, R&D pro-
ductivity, and patenting activity.
25 As Rosenberg
.  . and Nelson 1994 p. 340 note: ‘‘What university
research most often does today is to stimulate and
enhance the power of R&D done in industry, as
contrasted with providing a substitute for it.’’ The
second motivation is access to key university person-
22 The term virtual diversification is used to differentiate busi-
ness expansion by joining a partnership from more traditional
kinds of diversification such as internal expansion and
mergersracquisitions.
23 . . See Rosenberg and Nelson 1994 and Hounshell 1996 for
historical overviews.
24 . . . See Blumenthal et al. 1986 , Jaffe 1989 , Adams 1990 ,
. .  . Berman 1990 , Feller 1990 , Mansfield 1991; 1992 , Van de
. . Ven 1993 , Bonaccorsi and Piccaluga 1994 , Klevorick et al.
. . . 1994 , Zucker et al. 1994 , Henderson et al. 1995 , Mansfield
. . . and Lee 1996 , Zechhauser 1996 , Campbell 1997 , Cohen et
. . al. 1997 and Baldwin and Link 1998 .
25 . Cockburn and Henderson 1997 show that it was important
for innovative pharmaceutical firms to maintain ties to universi-
ties. Perhaps research ties with universities increase the absorptive
. capacity, in the sense of Cohen and Levinthal 1989 , of the
innovative firms.
nel.
26 The administration-based financial pressures
for faculty to engage in applied commercial research
27 .  with industry are growing. Zechhauser 1996 p.
. 12,746 is subtle when he refers to the supposed
importance of industry-supported research to univer-
sities as he describes how such relationships might
wx develop: ‘‘Information gifts to industry may be a
wx part of a university’s commercial courtship ritual.’’
Overall, however, there is a void of information
about the nature of the industry–university interac-
tion that occurs when the two informally partner in
an research partnership.
4.2.4. Benefits from participation in research part-
nerships
. Link and Bauer 1987a; b; 1989 have shown a
positive correlation between cooperative R&D con-
ducted by a firm, the firm’s market share, and the
productivity of the firm’s in-house R&D. The latter
result has been interpreted to suggest that participa-
tion in a research partnership increases the absorp-
tive capacity of firms with regard to their R&D
activity.
. Along these same lines, Scott 1996 reports, for
an analysis of a small sample of firms that formed
research partnerships to develop new processes for
reducing toxic air emission, that cooperation appears
to foster new research that would not have been
initiated without the cooperative experience. This
conclusion for toxic air emission is similar to the
conclusions reached by others that cooperation in
R&D does expand the scope of the firm’s R&D
horizon. Besides case study work, however, the em-
pirical evidence on this point is severely limited. The
. earlier concern of Scott 1988; 1993 is that
widespread cooperation could lead to a decrease in
competition, and this decrease may not be offset by
an increase in innovation-related benefits, may in-
deed have merit. A related argument, combining
some initial evidence on multimarket and multipro-
26 . . See Leyden and Link 1992 and Burnham 1997 . Link
. 1995 documents that one reason for the growth of Research
. Triangle Park NC was the desire of industrial research firms to
 locate near the triangle universities University of North Carolina
in Chapel Hill, North Carolina State University in Raleigh, and
. Duke University in Durham .
27 . . See Berman 1990 , Feller 1990 , and Henderson et al.
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ject contact between pairs of firms in U.S.-based
research partnerships has also echoed by Vonortas
. forthcoming .
. Link 1998a; b reported that members of two
ATP-sponsored research partnerships experienced
gains in their R&D efficiency as well. These gains
were realized from reduced duplication of research
costs and reduced cycle time. Two additional case
studies reached similar conclusions in terms of re-
porting significant benefits to the participating firms
. Vonortas, 1999 . Relatedly, a similar experience
was reported by the members of SEMATECH from
the organizations collaborative efforts. Link et al.
. 1996 estimated that research collaboration through
SEMATECH earned member firms a return of about
63% on their membership dues. These benefits ac-
crued primarily through reduced duplication of re-
search costs.
28
The empirical evidence of benefits to partnership
members has depended primarily on case studies.
While this literature has shown generally high re-
turns to collaboration, it must be emphasized that it
does suffer from selection bias; the partnerships stud-
ied often tend to be some of the most successful, and
hence those with high returns.
5. Policies toward research partnerships
A major objective of policies toward research
partnerships in the early 1980s in both the United
. States and the European Community EC was to
arrest the relative decline in the international compet-
itiveness of high technology sectors. R&D featured
prominently on the policy agenda. Both regions in-
troduced major changes in the law to accommodate
the policy shift. The United States moved forward
with a twin strategy of relaxing its relatively strict
antitrust laws and of strengthening its intellectual
property rights policy laws. The EC moved forward
by creating the legal basis for central science and
technology policy in the Single European Act of
1987, and by institutionalizing a series of 4-year,
successive Framework Programmes on Research and
28 For earlier work on cooperative research as related to the
. semiconductor industry see, for example, Erdilek 1989 . See also
. Mowery 1989 on high temperature superconductivity.
. Technological Development FWPs . Interestingly,
the promotion of cooperative R&D became a central
policy tool for both the U.S. and the EC at about the
same time. Meanwhile, Japan continued its long-
standing policy on cooperative R&D, having under-
gone a major shift in the focus of most government
sponsored research partnerships in the late 1970s.
The rationale for the Japanese partnerships changed
from assisting various industries to catch up with the
world’s state-of-the-art technology to assisting high
technology firms and industries push the state-of-the-
art forward. Highlighted below are selective national
policies related to research partnerships; no effort is




The U.S. government acted on research partner-
ships in the early 1980s under mounting evidence
that an increasing number of firms in high technol-
ogy sectors had started to choose cooperative R&D
agreements routinely to carry out technological activ-
ities. The willingness of policy decision-makers to
promote cooperative R&D rested on concerns about
the relative loss of international economic competi-
tiveness. These fears were fueled by the apparent
success of fast-follower countries that promoted co-
operative R&D to access, assimilate, and diffuse
technology quickly. Japan served as a prominent
example. The necessary policy justification for col-
laboration was provided by traditional economic ar-
gument of market failure in R&D.
This new competitive policy approach was under-
lined in the United States by the extensive changes
in antitrust and intellectual property rights regulation
beginning in the early 1980s. The Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission promoted
a new approach to examining the competitive effects
of partial mergers, which included research partner-
ships. Rather than a per se approach, such mergers
should be judged on a rule-of-reason basis where the
static anticompetitive effects would be weighted
against the dynamic benefit effects from the partner-
29 . . See Rothwell 1989 and Rosegger 1996 for earlier reviews
. of such policies in Europe, and Audretsch 1989 for an earlier
. . review related to Japan. Martin 1996 and Vonortas 1991 have
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ship. This change in approach eventually led to the
passage of the National Cooperative Research Act
. NCRA of 1984, and its 1993 amendment the Na-
tional Cooperative Research and Production Act
. 30 NCRPA . All filings are published in the Federal
Register.
Also, in the early 1980s, there was a series of
legislative actions, starting with the Baye–Dole Act
in 1980, that created a legal framework for permit-
ting government contractors to benefit financially
from the results of the research undertaken with or
 for the government excepting national defense
. items . This legislation spurred research cooperation
between industry, universities and government labo-
ratories. Part of the induced collaborative activity
. involving government labs is conducted under Co-
operative Research and Development Agreements, or
CRADAs.
5.2. EC policies
Similar to the United States, the EC entered the
1980s with increasing anxiety over the perceived
gradual loss of competitiveness and the effects of
globalization in high-technology industries. In the
EC’s case, however, there were other factors influ-
encing policy in addition to the widely perceived
change in the global forces affecting R&D and
innovation. These other factors included the conti-
nuing expansion of the Community and the wide
disparities between the industrial and technological
capabilities of the various country members; the
already well established, but very different, S&T
policy infrastructures in a number of the larger and
wealthier country members, and the total lack of
such infrastructures in the cohesion country mem-
bers; and the absence of the appropriate legal frame-
work and institutions at the EC level for supporting a
consistent technology policy.
The catalytic events in the early 1980s in the form
of rapid technological advances and the loss of mar-
ket share by the indigenous European electronics
industry led the European Commission in 1981 to
establish the pilot ESPRIT program with the en-
30 For an institutional perspective of the NCRA see, for exam-
. ple, Scott 1989; 1993 .
dorsement of the twelve largest European producers
of electronics. ESPRIT served as the progenitor of
. the European Framework Programs on R&D FWPs
to which it lent many of its features. One such
feature was the support of cooperative R&D. An-
other was the public support of pre-competitive or
pre-normative research that was sufficiently far from
the market. FWPs have become the vehicle for the
implementation of the S&T policy of the European
Union. FWPs provide the policy umbrella encom-
passing all programs through which the EC supports
R&D in particular areas.
Four FWPs have already been completed: 1984–
1987, 1987–1991, 1990–1994, and 1994–1998. The
. fifth 1998–2002 has just been initiated. A pre-
requisite for support — up to 50% of total joint
research costs — of a research partnership is the
inclusion of agents based in at least two EU member
countries; industry, universities and research labora-
tories can participate.
Needless to say, European policies for coopera-
tive R&D go beyond the EC level; they spread
across all EU member states.
31 Given the wide
variety of national S&T policy systems in Europe,
policies targeted to cooperative R&D vary signifi-
cantly. Among EU member countries, one can distin-
guish between the four large industrialized and R&D
 spending countries France, Germany, Italy, and
. United Kingdom , the seven small to medium size
 industrialized countries Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
. Finland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Sweden ,
and the four less industrialized cohesion countries
. Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain that formally
introduced S&T policy only during the last few
decades. Even within these groups, there are great
differences between countries with traditionally more
. centralized S&T policy systems e.g., France and
 others with more decentralized systems e.g., Ger-
31 European S&T policy is still primarily determined at the
. national i.e., EU member country level. Moreover, the R&D
budget of the European Union is still small in comparison to the
R&D budget of nation states. For example, the annual budget of
the Framework Programs is currently about 7% of the total
civilian R&D spending by European countries, amounting to
approximately US$60 billion in 1997. Additional R&D funds are
dispersed by the European Commission through the structural
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. many ; or between countries with traditional mis-
. sion-oriented polices e.g., France and UK and those
 with a tradition in diffusion-oriented polices e.g.,
. Germany .
This diversity has also been reflected in policy
approaches to cooperative R&D, including the na-
ture and extent of government involvement in pro-
moting and regulating research partnerships.
32 There
are, nonetheless, some general trends across regions.
One trend is that, while the European Framework
Programs have tended to support pre-competitive
cooperative research, nationalrregional policies have
often supported partnerships dealing with research
closer to market. A second trend is that national and
regional governments across Europe have tried to
use research partnerships as one of the mechanisms
for strengthening the links among industries, univer-
sities, and government laboratories. A third trend is
that governments at all levels have increasingly seen
strategic partnering and network building as mecha-
nisms to enhance technological prowess and eco-
nomic competitiveness in high-technology manufac-
turing and service sectors.
5.3. Japanese policies
Japan was a pioneer in supporting cooperative
R&D in the post-War period. Like industrial policy
and general S&T policy, the objectives and organi-
zation of Japanese cooperative R&D organizations
have changed over this time period. The idea of
research associations was basically imported from
the UK after the war, but the use of research associa-
tions was transformed from an instrument for assist-
ing declining firms and industries to an instrument
for gathering, adapting, and distributing technologi-
cal information more efficiently in high technology
industries. Following the Mining and Manufacturing
Industry Technology Research Association of 1961,
a large number of Japanese Engineering Research
. Associations ERAs were established in a wide
. variety of sectors Sigurdson, 1986 . More recently,
. Sakakibara 1997 documented 237 government pro-
32 Several recent research projects supported by the Targeted
Socio-Economic Research Program of the European Commission
have looked at various aspects of policies related to research
partnerships in Europe.
moted ERAs set up between 1959 and 1992; how-
ever, it is hard to know exactly how many ERAs
have been established due to the lack of a unified
source of information.
In the mid-1970s, the focus of ERAs changed
significantly from generatingradapting specific tech-
nologies, to assisting sectors catch up with world
technology, to undertaking state-of-the-art research
to provide a broader technological superstructure for
. high technology sectors Oshima and Kodama, 1986 .
An early example of the more aggressive ERAs is
. the very large scale integration circuit VLSI associ-
ation.
While many ERAs have reportedly met their ob-
jectives successfully, it is rather doubtful that any of
them produced the returns to industry that western
countries thought at the time. Government funds
were small, measurable technology outputs fairly
modest, and collaboration often meant an agreement
to share only the cost but not the research process.
ERAs represent only one form of collaborative
R&D in Japan. Such cooperation has also included
trade associations, joint research institutes, collabora-
. tion within large firm networks keiretsu , and
private sector formal and informal collaborative
agreements. Japanese firms have also been active
participants in international research partnerships.
The basic difference of ERAs is that they are formed
under the auspices and guidance of the government
and often include a significant proportion of the
large players in a technological area.
6. Conclusions
According to available theory and empirical evi-
dence, firms participate in research partnerships in
order to:
¯ decrease transaction costs in activities governed
by incomplete contracts;
¯ broaden the effective scope of activities;
¯ increase efficiency, synergy, and power through
the creation of networks;
¯ access external complementary resources and ca-
pabilities to better exploit existing resources and
develop sustained competitive advantage;
¯ promote organizational learning, internalize core
competencies, and enhance competitiveness;() J. Hagedoorn et al.rResearch Policy 29 2000 567–586 583
¯ create new investment options in high-opportun-
ity, high-risk activities;
¯ internalize knowledge spillovers and enhance the
appropriability of research results, while increas-
ing information sharing among partners;
¯ lower R&D costs;
¯ pool risk; and
¯ co-opt competition.
Governments have promoted and supported re-
search partnerships in order to:
¯ correct market failures in R&D investment, par-
ticularly in the presence of highly non-appropria-
ble research;
¯ speed up technological innovation, aiming at in-
creased international competitiveness; and
¯ increase technological information exchange
among firms, universities, public research insti-
tutes.
Theory clearly warns public authorities, technol-
ogy policy authorities in particular, to be cautious
and to be aware of the downside effects associated
with collaboration. With all their benefits, partner-
ships have the negative potential to block competi-
tion and create various kinds of static and dynamic
 monopolies in existing and future markets, respec-
. tively .
Much research remains before contributions from
economics, management, and public policy studies
have a broader unified base of understanding of
these phenomena. A unified framework to explain
and analyze research partnerships is still lacking.
Particular emphasis must continue to be paid to
empirical research, even though it has tended to lag
theoretical analysis in this subject because of data
limitations. We expect that future empirical research
will increase as more complete databases become
available and expand in coverage, and it will system-
atically begin to evaluate both the private and social
returns associated with collaboration.
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